Highlighted Selections from:

Public vs. Nonpublic Data: The Benefits of Administrative Control

Lagos, Y and Polonestsky, J. Public vs. Nonpublic Data: The Benefits of Administrative Control. Stanford Law Review Online. 2013. web. http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/public-vs-nonpublic-data

p.3: Two different threat models create a risk of re-identification—-i.e., reconnecting an individual with what is usually called “personal data” in the European Union and “personally identifiable information” (PII) in the United States. First, outsiders can potentially re-identify an individual by comparing quasi-identifiers in a de-identified database with an identified database, such as a voter registration list. Outsider attacks can come from bad actors or academics, attempting to exploit or show weaknesses in DeID-T protections. In fact, the highest profile re-identification attacks have come from academics attempting to re-identify individuals in publicly disclosed databases. Second, insiders can potentially re-identify an individual by using knowledge that is not generally known. For instance, a Facebook friend, acquaintance, or “skillful Googler” might exploit information that only a limited set of people know, such as a Facebook post mentioning a hospital visit. -- Highlighted mar 6, 2014

p.6: The HIPAA de-identification standard that requires a “very small” risk of re-identification before publicly releasing health data is an example of a relatively strict standard for re-identification, designed for datasets that can be made fully public. -- Highlighted mar 6, 2014

p.6: Thus, if administrative controls do not receive regulatory recognition, the original data collector would be subject to a steeper regulatory burden than potential downstream recipients. -- Highlighted mar 6, 2014